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Abstract
Feature selection is the process of sieving features, in which informative features
are separated from the redundant and irrelevant ones. This process plays an
important role in machine learning, data mining and bioinformatics. However,
traditional feature selection methods are only capable of processing centralized
datasets and are not able to satisfy today’s distributed data processing needs.
These needs require a new category of data processing algorithms called privacy-
preserving feature selection, which protects users’ data by not revealing any part
of the data neither in the intermediate processing nor in the final results. This is
vital for the datasets which contain individuals’ data, such as medical datasets.
Therefore, it is rational to either modify the existing algorithms or propose
new ones to not only introduce the capability of being applied to distributed
datasets, but also act responsibly in handling users’ data by protecting their
privacy. In this paper, we will review three privacy-preserving feature selection
methods and provide suggestions to improve their performance when any gap is
identified. We will also propose a privacy-preserving feature selection method
based on the rough set feature selection. The proposed method is capable of
processing both horizontally and vertically partitioned datasets in two- and
multi-parties scenarios.
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1. Introduction
Collecting and accumulating data in a systematic way, such as in datasets
and data tables, for further processing, is very important for any organization,
department and, in a broader view, to any country. A dataset is composed of
several data tables, in which each table contains several columns that correspond
to variables (also called features or attributes) and rows which represent records
(also called samples or objects). In machine learning, each dataset contains only
one data table, and dataset and data table concepts are used interchangeably.
As is shown in Table 1, for each row of a dataset, different variables are measured
and inserted into the provided cells. Later, all the collected data are processed
for a variety of purposes using different statistical and mathematical methods.
Table 1 shows a portion of Haberman’s Survival dataset adopted from the UCI
repository of machine learning [1]. In this dataset, each row represents a single
patient, and columns show the age, year of operation and the number of auxiliary
nodes of each patient. The last column presents a class label for each patient
to show whether they have survived for five years or longer (represented by 1)
or not (represented by 2).
Since the collected data can be categorized either as sensitive (e.g., medi-
cal, financial, military) or non-sensitive (e.g., publicly available data, the UCI
datasets) data, the algorithms applied should be selected accordingly, so that
the data can be accessed only as is appropriate. With the dramatic increase in
the amount of information generated annually, privacy challenges are becoming
a serious issue for governments and health related organizations. Therefore,
many countries are investing heavily in designing, implementing and applying
privacy-preserving methods [2].
In US law, privacy is the right “to be let alone” [3] and should be pro-
tected by taking proper actions [4]. In computer science, privacy of individuals
deals with deciding how one’s information will be used. For instance, some-
one’s health information should be kept secure and be shared only with physi-
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Table 1: Partial View of Haberman’s Survival Dataset
Age Year Auxiliary nodes Class
...
...
...
...
42 61 4 1
42 62 20 1
42 65 0 1
42 63 1 1
43 58 52 2
43 59 2 2
43 64 0 2
43 64 0 2
43 63 14 1
43 64 2 1
...
...
...
...
cians who have been chosen by the patient. These concerns necessitate a cate-
gory of data-mining methods called privacy-preserving data-mining. “Privacy-
preserving data-mining” refers to knowledge extraction techniques specific to
privacy criteria. The main goal of these processes is to introduce a trade-off
between accuracy and the amount of information revealed publicly. Generally
speaking, the amount of raw data produced is much greater than the informa-
tion that needs to be extracted from them. Therefore, more efforts and time are
needed to process, save and maintain those data for later processing (such as
classification or clustering). Many problems in machine-learning, data-mining
and pattern recognition involve big datasets. A high-dimensional dataset (e.g.,
DNA microarray data), in terms of number of features and samples, requires a
huge effort to be processed. Therefore, feature selection (FS) methods are used
to effectively reduce the size of datasets (in one direction) by selecting only the
most relevant columns. These methods select the most informative features,
which are highly correlated with the outcome and loosely dependent on other
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features, so as to minimize further processing. Since the size of datasets can
also be reduced in terms of number of samples, sample selection (SS) methods
have emerged to reduce the size of datasets by removing irrelevant samples. By
employing FS and SS methods, dataset dimensions can be lowered and further
processing can become more efficient.
In this paper, existing feature selection algorithms which consider privacy
concerns as well as the application in distributed datasets will be investigated.
We will also perform a thorough comparison from different aspects, such as per-
formance, applicability, security and privacy. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows: Section 2 depicts background and Section 3 surveys related work.
Section 4 discusses the proposed approaches and Sections 5 concludes the paper.
2. Background
Vast amounts of research have been conducted in different areas of data-
mining and machine-learning to satisfy the need for protecting individuals’ pri-
vacy [5, 6, 7]. Surprisingly however, feature selection methods have not kept up
with the developing need for privacy and security. Feature selection is the pro-
cess of purifying data by retaining the most informative features while omitting
the others. The important role of feature selection methods in reducing model
complexity for further processing is undeniable. Each dataset contains three
types of features: informative, redundant and irrelevant. The most informa-
tive, non-redundant relevant features convey sufficient amounts of information
for the outcome. Redundant features contain chunks of information that are
indistinguishable from other similar features and can be removed. Features be-
longing to the last type are unnecessary (such as a feature with constant value
for all examples) and can be eliminated due to not having any information for
the classification outcome.
2.1. Feature Selection
Before looking at privacy-preserving aspects of data-mining, we will review
some of the existing feature selection methods. Feature selection methods have
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been divided into two main groups: feature ranking and feature subset selection
[8]. The former is a set of methods that rank features based on some specific
measure values and select the top n number of features. The latter evaluates
subsets of features and selects the one with the highest fitness value. Either
of the aforementioned groups can be addressed using filter-based or wrapper-
based approaches [9]. In the filter-based approach, a merit evaluates the quality
of every feature regardless of its impact on the outcome, while wrapper-based
approaches measure the effectiveness of features based on the results of already
chosen classifiers. Wrapper-based methods are highly computationally-intensive
and powerful in predicting the outcome compared to filter-based methods, which
are faster but potentially inaccurate.
One of the most well-known feature selection methods is Relief [10], which
measures the relevancy of a feature compared to other features of the same and
different classes by calculating their Euclidean distance. Hall [11] has proposed
a merit based on the average intra-correlation of features and inter-correlation of
features to the outcome. This merit selects features that are highly correlated to
the outcome while lowly correlated to the other features. Jensen et al. [12] have
introduced a novel feature selection method based on the lower approximation
of a fuzzy-rough set, in which dependency of the features to the outcome is
calculated using a merit called dependency degree (DD). Fuzzy-rough DD selects
a new feature if it improves the discernibility power of the already selected
features toward distinction of different classes of the outcome. Anaraki et al.
[13] have developed a simple control criterion for the conventional fuzzy-rough
feature selection (FRFS) to direct the process of adding features to the reduct
set by considering a lower bound for the distinguishability power of the feature
being considered. Also, they have reviewed and surveyed different methods
proposed in rough set feature selection (RSFS) in [14]. Anaraki et al. [15] have
introduced the following two modifications of FRFS to improve the performance
of the conventional method: guiding the selection process in equal situations,
where diverse subsets with only one different feature result in identical DD, and
integrating the first improvement with the criterion that stops it [13]. Figure
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1 shows an equal situation for subsets {b, a} and {b, c}, in which the two sets
differ by one member ({a} and {c}) and for both DD = 0.34 .
Figure 1: Equal situation
2.2. Privacy-Preserving Data-Mining
There are two different approaches to privacy-preserving data-mining: meth-
ods to perturb data before publishing which are called randomization, and
methods to perform mathematical operations securely which are called secure
multi-party computation (SMC). Figure 2 shows how data are represented to
privacy-preserving data-mining methods.
Data
Centralized Distributed
Horizontally
partitioned
Vertically
partitioned
Figure 2: Data representation in privacy-preserving data-mining
In 2000, interestingly, two papers with the identical title of Privacy-
Preserving Data-Mining were published [6, 5]. Agrawal and Srikant [6] proposed
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a secure decision tree classifier, which can be applied to the perturbed and ran-
domized data by reconstructing distribution using a Bayesian procedure. In
the other paper, Lindell and Pinkas [5] proposed a secure protocol for the ID3
classifier on two-party horizontally partitioned data. The core of their method
is a secure version of xlnx in which x is a two-party distributed data. Since the
publication of these two seminal works, many protocols and methods have been
proposed using both approaches for various data-mining, machine-learning and
statistical analysis methods and algorithms.
2.2.1. Centralized
Randomization. In this approach, data is centralized and the data owner wishes
to publish their data for mining purposes. To do so, the data should be per-
turbed using randomization techniques before being transmitted, and are then
reconstructed at the destination. The main challenge in randomization is the
trade-off between privacy and accuracy.
Features in privacy-preserving data-mining are divided into three main cat-
egories: explicit identifiers (EI), quasi identifiers (QI) and sensitive identifiers
(SI). Explicit identifiers are those features of a dataset which promptly reveal
individuals’ identification, such as name and medical care plan (MCP) number.
Theses features should be removed to protect an individual’s privacy. Quasi
identifiers are those features which could be combined with publicly available
data such as Netflix movies ranking to identify individuals. In 2006, Netflix
released information on 100 million ratings to a competition called Netflix Prize
to challenge researchers in order to find the best algorithm for predicting user
ratings [16]. However, a few months later Netflix ratings were linked to the
internet movie database (IMDB) ratings and individuals were identified [17].
Sensitive identifiers refer to that information which is private to some individu-
als, such as disease information in medical datasets and should be also removed
from the dataset [18].
In the case of having sensitive attributes, three methods have been proposed
to protect individuals’ privacy as follows:
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1. k-anonymity: If each record in a dataset is indistinguishable from (k − 1)
other records (see Table 2 adopted from [18])
2. l-diversity: If an equivalent class of a dataset has l diverse values for the
sensitive attribute
3. t-closeness: If the distance of the distribution of a sensitive attribute value
in an equivalent class to the distribution of the same attribute is less than
t
Table 2: An example of 3-anonymized dataset
Row Index Age ZIP Code Disease
1 [20, 30] Northeastern US HIV
2 [30, 40] Western US Hepatitis C
3 [20, 30] Northeastern US HIV
4 [30, 40] Western US Hepatitis C
5 [30, 40] Western US Diabetes
6 [20, 30] Northeastern US HIV
2.2.2. Distributed
Secure Multi-Party Computation. In SMC, secure mathematical and statisti-
cal computations are applied to different portions of data in the possession of
different parties. This approach has the same results as non-secure algorithms;
however, the main challenge in secure methods is the trade-off between security
and efficiency. In an n-party environment, datasets are divided into n chunks
and all parties demanding of running a specific mining algorithm (e.g., classifi-
cation) or statistical analysis (e.g. correlation coefficient) on all n chunks as a
single dataset without revealing any private information to the others.
Data in SMC can be partitioned either vertically or horizontally (see Figure
3) and depending on how the data are partitioned, “partition-specific” methods
need to be applied. It is worth mentioning that data partitioning here is different
from database partitioning in the distributed database management system [19],
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in which the main goal is to improve performance. In vertical partitioning, each
party (e.g., different departments of a store) might posses a subset of features
(e.g., purchased items from a specific department) while accommodating all
samples (e.g., customers). In horizontal partitioning, each party might posses a
subset of samples while accommodating all features. For example, Hospital A in
Newfoundland and Labrador, Hospital B in Ontario and Hospital C in British
Columbia have a Haberman’s Survival dataset (as shown in Table 1) of people
in their provinces. So, they all share the same structure and features for their
datasets, but different records.
Figure 3: Horizontally and vertically partitioned data
3. Related Work
In this section we will discuss three privacy-preserving feature selection meth-
ods which have been introduced in the last seven years. Each method is pre-
sented in detail and in case of identifying any gap, some comments are provided
to improve the performance of the proposed methods.
Jafer et al. [20] have proposed a privacy-aware filter-based feature selec-
tion that probes the inter-correlation of features to remove quasi-identifier (QI)
features. In their paper, the authors introduce a system which contains two sep-
arate blocks: one for evaluating features, and the other one for controlling the
privacy aspects of feature selection. In the former, features are ranked based on
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InfoGain [21] and Relief criteria [10]. In the latter, the list is traversed from bot-
tom to top and correlation of QI features and non-QI features is calculated. By
referring to the controlling values of the Correlation Block, features are selected
or discarded. We have adopted Figure 4 from [20] to illustrate the proposed
system.
Figure 4: Privacy-aware filter-based feature selection
The Evaluation Block accepts dataset D, ranker threshold T , evaluation
measure e, such as information gain and chi-square, and the type of feature
selection FS, such as feature subset as inputs and {R} is the ranked list fea-
tures in the intermediate output. Later, the Correlation Block takes the ranked
list {R}, the privacy-breaching attributes {pa}, the correlation measure c, such
as symmetric uncertainty, the discretization factor d for converting continuous
values of the features to discrete ones as the requirement of correlation mea-
sure, and the balancing parameter between privacy and accuracy λ, in order to
produce the set of selected attributes {sa} as the final output. The balancing
parameter λ varies from zero to one, in which moving from zero to one increases
the number of the selected QI features.
After evaluating features using e, features are sorted in descending order
list. Then, the correlation of the QI features in the list is calculated from
bottom to up against other features using c, and those QI features which have
a correlation greater than λ will be removed. This process repeats until all
QI features are investigated. This method guarantees to preserve privacy and
select the most important features; however, there are four concerns about the
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method as follows:
1. Inter-correlation of the features and the class have not been investigated
2. In case of having two perfectly correlated QI and non-QI features, only
the QI feature is removed
3. The case where more than one perfectly correlated non-QI feature to a QI
feature exists has not been discussed
4. Security and complexity analysis of the proposed method are missing
Banerjee and Chakravarty [22] have developed a distributed privacy-
preserving method based on the virtual dimensionality reduction method in
image processing [23] to select features. This method takes advantage of corre-
lation and covariance eigenvalues to perform feature selection on both horizon-
tally and vertically partitioned data. It starts with calculating the correlation
and the convenience matrices of a dataset, and continues with computing the
eigenvalues of both of the matrices. Then, for each feature, the corresponding
correlation-eigenvalue and covariance-eigenvalue is subtracted. If the resulting
value is greater than a user-specified threshold δ then the feature is kept in the
reduct subset, otherwise, it will be discarded. This process continues until all
features of the dataset are examined.
For both horizontally and vertically partitioned data, the correlation and
the covariance are calculated securely over all parties; however, the eigenvalue
decomposition is done locally to reduce communication costs. In both scenarios,
the threshold δ, number of rows of dataset D as N(D), summation of feature j
values as FSj(D), standard deviation of each feature σ(j), and sum of product
of values of features i and j as SSij(D) should be calculated. Finally, the
covariance and the correlation between the two features i and j are computed
as shown in Equation 1 and 2, respectively.
COV (i, j) =
SSij(D)
N(D)
− FSi(D)× FSj(D)
N(D)2
, (1)
CORR(i, j) =
COV (i, j)
σ(i)× σ(j) . (2)
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For horizontally partitioned data, each party p calculates Np(D), FSpj (D),
σ(j)p and SSpij(D), and then they apply secure sum protocol to calculate the
aggregation results. Finally, each party performs feature selection based on the
resulting eigenvalues of the calculated covariance and the correlation. With n
number of records, m features and p parties, the communication cost would be
O(mp), since the only secure operation used in the horizontally partitioned data
is secure sum.
For vertically partitioned data, each party can calculate N(D), FSj(D),
σ(j) locally; however, the calculation of SSpij(D) depends on whether both
attributes of i and j are in the same partition or not. If so, the calculation
is straight forward. Otherwise, both parties should use secure dot product to
calculate SSij(D). The communication cost of the vertically partitioned data
is O(m2np), which is mainly imposed by the secure dot product operation.
Das [24] et al. have introduced three asynchronous feature selection meth-
ods based on the misclassification gain, Gini index and entropy measures for
binary-class datasets with categorical features in horizontally partitioned fash-
ion. The main requirement for the proposed methods is a P2P network with
a structured ring-based topology. The distributed setup of each measure (i.e.
misclassification gain, Gini index and entropy) to evaluate every feature Ai are
shown in Equations 3, 4 and 5, respectively.
mi−1∑
a=0
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
l=1
{
x
(l)
i,a0 − x(l)i,a1
}∣∣∣∣∣ , (3)
where each feature Ai can take a value from {0, . . . ,mi− 1}, d is the number of
peers, and x
(l)
i,a0 and x
(l)
i,a1 are the number of examples with the value of Ai = a
and class value of 0 and 1, respectively.
mi−1∑
a=0

(∑d
l=1 x
(l)
i,a0
)2
+
(∑d
l=1 x
(l)
i,a1
)2
∑d
l=1 x
(l)
i,a
 , (4)
where x
(l)
i,a is the number of examples with Ai = a.
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mi−1∑
a=0
{(
d∑
l=1
x
(l)
i,a0
)
log
(∑d
l=1 x
(l)
i,a0∑d
l=1 x
(l)
i,a
)
+
(
d∑
l=1
x
(l)
i,a1
)
log
(∑d
l=1 x
(l)
i,a1∑d
l=1 x
(l)
i,a
)}
. (5)
For computing misclassification gain, Gini index, and entropy across all
peers, each peer Pi estimates Equation 3, 4, and 5 for feature Ai when it takes
value a, respectively. This process starts from an initiator and continues by each
peer with adding their value to the received data. When the initiator receives
the data, it calculates the average using the asymmetric network topology ver-
sion (see Equation 6) of the method proposed by Scherber and Papadopoulos
[25].
z
(t)
i = {1−2ρ|Γi,1|−ρ(n∗i −|Γi,1|)}z(t−1)i +2ρ
∑
q∈Γi,1
z(t−1)q +ρ
n∗i−|Γi,1|∑
q=1
z(t−1)q , (6)
where z
(t)
i is an estimate of average at the time t by ith peer, ρ is the rate of
convergence, |Γi,1| is the size of set of neighbours of peer i in hop-distance one,
and n∗i is the size of the ring formed by peer i.
To establish a trade-off between privacy and the cost of computations, the
authors have introduced an objective function for each peer i as follows:
fobji = wti × threat− wci × cost,
where wti and wci are the weights for thread and cost, threat is a measure
which represents the risk that each peer might take by participating in the
current computation, and cost includes both computation and communication
costs. The time complexity for the proposed methods based on three measures
is O(max(n∗i , n
∗
j )), where n
∗
i is the optimal value for peer Pi and n
∗
j is the value
for the neighbour Pj in the same ring.
In this section, we have discussed three privacy-preserving feature selection
methods, each trying to address feature selection issues in distributed datasets
through decentralized computation.
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4. Discussion and Contribution
All the discussed methods have provided a variety of secure protocols for
different data configurations (i.e. horizontally and vertically partitioned data)
to preserve individuals’ privacy. The proposed methods have been backed up
with security, computational and communication complexity analyses. How-
ever, there are obvious limitations for the mentioned privacy-preserving feature
selection methods from privacy-preserving aspects. On one side, they can be
applied to either horizontally or vertically partitioned data which limits users
by imposing specific data configuration. On the other side, they are not suited
for both two- and multi-party data configurations. To address the mentioned
deficiencies we are providing four privacy-preserving versions of rough set fea-
ture selection [26] for both horizontally and vertically partitioned datasets as
follows:
• Two-party with horizontally partitioned data (2P-HP)
• Multi-party with horizontally partitioned data (MP-HP)
• Two-party with vertically partitioned data (2P-VP)
• Multi-party with vertically partitioned data (MP-VP)
5. Proposed method
Rough set theory was proposed by Pawlak as a tool for dealing with uncer-
tainty [27]. Data in rough set theory are organized in a decision table. Table
3 shows a decision table adopted from [26]. Class attribute is called decision
attribute and the rest are condition attributes. In Table 3, {Walk} is a decision
attribute and {Age, LEMS} are condition attributes.
Let U = {x1, x2, . . . , x7} be the universe of discourse and let R be the equiva-
lence relation on U, approximation space is shown by (U, R). Set of all attributes
are shown by A = {AGE,LEMS,WALK}, set of all conditional attributes by
C = {Age, LEMS} and set of decision attribute(s) or class attribute(s) by
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Table 3: An example of decision table
Object Age LEMS Walk
x1 16-30 50 Yes
x2 16-30 0 No
x3 31-45 1-25 No
x4 31-45 1-25 Yes
x5 46-60 26-49 No
x6 16-30 26-49 Yes
x7 46-60 26-49 No
D = {WALK}. Let X be a subset of U and P to be a subset of A, approxi-
mating this subset using rough set theory is done by means of upper and lower
approximations. Upper approximation of X with regards to (PX) contains
objects which are possibly classified in X regarding the attributes in P . Ob-
jects in lower approximation (PX) are the ones which are surely classified in
X regarding the attributes in P . Boundary region of X can be determined by
subtracting upper approximation from lower approximation and where it is a
non-empty set, X is called a rough set otherwise it is a crisp set. Rough set is
shown by an ordered pair (PX, PX). Different regions are defined using this
pair as below:
POSP (Q) =
⋃
X∈U/Q
PX (7)
NEGP (Q) = U−
⋃
X∈U/Q
PX (8)
BNDP (Q) =
⋃
X∈U/Q
PX −
⋃
X∈U/Q
PX (9)
Positive region of partition U/Q is a set of all objects which can be uniquely
classified into blocks of partition by means of P . Negative region is a set of
objects which cannot be classified to the partition U/Q[26].
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Finding dependency between attributes is one of the most important areas
in data analysis. Let P and Q be subsets of A, dependency of Q on P are
denoted by P ⇒k Q and k = γp(Q), in which γ is dependency degree [26]. If
k = 1, Q depends totally on P and if k < 1, Q depends partially on P .
Value of k is a measure of dependency between features. In feature selection,
those features which are loosely dependent on each other and highly correlated
to decision feature are desired. If Q totally depends on P , it means that the
partition which is made by P is finer than Q. Calculating dependency is shown
in Equation 10.
k = γP (Q) =
|POSP (Q)|
|U| (10)
The notation |.| is used for cardinality. Positive region of the partition U/Q
with respect to P which is denoted by γ, is the set of all elements which can be
classified to partition U/Q using P [26]. Reduct is a subset of features which
has the same dependency degree as employing all features for classification.
Features which belong to the reduct set are information-rich and the others are
irrelevant and redundant.
The QuickReduct algorithm which is given in [12] and depicted in Algorithm
1, calculates a reduct without finding all the subsets. It starts from an empty
set and each time selects a feature which causes greatest increase in dependency
degree. The algorithm stops when adding more features does not increase the
dependency degree. It does not guarantee to find minimal reduct as long as it
employs greedy forward search algorithm, which is vulnerable to local optimum.
The QuickReduct algorithm has been applied to the example dataset in Ta-
ble 3. The algorithm starts by calculating dependency of the outcome {WALK}
to each conditional features {Age, LEMS} as shown in Equation 11.
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Algorithm 1: QuickReduct algorithm
C, the set of all conditional attributes
D, the set of decision attributes
R← {}; γbest = 0; γprev = 0
do
T ← R
γprev ← γbest
foreach x ∈ (C −R)
if γR∪{x}(D) > γT (D)
T ← R ∪ {x}
γbest ← γT (D)
R← T
until γbest = γprev
return R
γ{Age}(Walk) =
|POS{Age}(Walk)|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}|
=
|⋃X∈{x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7}/Walk AgeX|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}|
=
|{x5, x7}|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}| =
2
7
(11)
γ{LEMS}(Walk) =
|POS{LEMS}(Walk)|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}|
=
|⋃X∈{x1,x2,x3,x4,x5,x6,x7}/Walk LEMSX|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}|
=
|{x1, x2}|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}| =
2
7
Since, the dependency degree of {LEMS} is equal to {Age}, either of them
can be selected and added to the reduct set R. This process continues by
selecting {LEMS} and adding {Age} to the reduct set; the dependency degree
of the set is calculated as shown in Equation 12.
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γ{Age,LEMS}(Walk) =
|POS{Age,LEMS}(Walk)|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}|
=
|⋃X∈U/Walk Age, LEMSX|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}| (12)
=
|{x1, x2, x5, x6, x7}|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}| =
5
7
As the resulting dependency of having both features in the reduct set is
greater than dependency degree of R = {LEMS}; therefore, the final result of
QuickReduct algorithm is R = {Age, LEMS}.
5.1. Two parties with horizontally partitioned data (2P-HP)
As an illustrative example, Table 3 has been partitioned horizontally into
two datasets DH1 and DH2 in possession of two parties P1 and P2, as shown in
Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
Table 4: The first partition of horizontally partitioned DH1
Object Age LEMS Walk
x1 16-30 50 Yes
x2 16-30 0 No
x3 31-45 1-25 No
x4 31-45 1-25 Yes
Table 5: The second partition of data DH2
Object Age LEMS Walk
x5 46-60 26-49 No
x6 16-30 26-49 Yes
x7 46-60 26-49 No
In order to uncover the required secure mathematical equations of 2P-HP for
calculating dependency degree of each partitioned data γP (Q)DH1 , the results of
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applying QuickReduct algorithm on each partition based on conditional feature
{Age}, is calculated in Equation 13.
γ{Age}(Walk)DH1 =
|POS{Age}(Walk)DH1 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|
=
|⋃X∈{x1,x2,x3,x4}/Walk AgeX|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|
=
|{}|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}| =
0
4
(13)
γ{Age}(Walk)DH2 =
|POS{Age}(Walk)DH2 |
|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
|⋃X∈{x5,x6,x7}/Walk AgeX|
|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
|{x5, x6, x7}|
|{x5, x6, x7}| =
3
3
By referring to the resulting dependency degree of conditional feature {Age}
for partition DH1 and DH2 ; it can be understood that the overall dependency
degree of conditional feature {Age} cannot be calculated by simply adding cor-
responding numerator and denominator of γ{Age}(Walk)DH1 to γ{Age}(Walk)DH2
as shown in Equation 14.
γ{Age}(Walk) = γ{Age}(Walk)DH1 + γ{Age}(Walk)DH2
=
|POS{Age}(Walk)DH1 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}| (14)
+
|POS{Age}(Walk)DH2 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
0
4 + 3
+
3
4 + 3
=
3
7
The reason is that, object x6 is in POS{Age}(Walk)DH2 ; whereas, if the
whole feature {Age}DH1 and {Age}DH2 is considered, it is indiscernible with x1
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and x2, which would prevent x6 from being a member of POS{Age}(Walk) and
the final dependency degree would be correct. To overcome this issue, a secure
comparison is needed to compare each features’ values of each partition with
the other one.
All objects in positive region of each party, should be compared with the ob-
jects in the other party to decide on indiscernibilities. In case of any occurrence,
numerator of dependency degree should be decreased by one.
This process starts from DH1 by checking all objects in POS{Age}(Walk)DH1 ;
since there is no object in the set, the process proceeds to DH2 . In the
second data partition, three objects have been recognized as members of
POS{Age}(Walk)DH2 ; therefore, this non-empty set leads to the commence of
the secure comparison process. The secure comparison of object x6 in DH2 with
the objects x1 and x2 in DH1 recognizes three objects as indiscernible; therefore,
the dependency degree in Equation 14 should be decreased by one as shown in
Equation 15.
γ{Age}(Walk) = γ{Age}(Walk)DH1 (15)
+ γ{Age}(Walk)DH2
− IND{Age}(Walk)D
=
|POS{Age}(Walk)DH1 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
+
|POS{Age}(Walk)DH2 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
− 1|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
0
4 + 3
+
3
4 + 3
− 1
4 + 3
=
2
7
where IND{Age}(Walk)D is the number of indiscernible objects in both parti-
tions.
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In order to decide which feature should be selected, the feature selection pro-
cess continues with calculating the dependency degree of {LEMS}. The result
of applying QuickReduct algorithm on each partition, individually is shown in
Equation 16.
γ{LEMS}(Walk)DH1 =
|POS{LEMS}(Walk)DH1 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|
=
|⋃X∈{x1,x2,x3,x4}/Walk LEMSX|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|
=
|{x1, x2}|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}| =
2
4
(16)
γ{LEMS}(Walk)DH2 =
|POS{LEMS}(Walk)DH2 |
|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
|⋃X∈{x5,x6,x7}/Walk LEMSX|
|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
|{}|
|{x5, x6, x7}| =
0
3
After calculating the dependency degree of the two parties, number of indis-
cernible objects should be calculated and subtracted from the final dependency
degree. The final result is shown in Equation 17.
γ{LEMS}(Walk) = γ{LEMS}(Walk)DH1
+ γ{LEMS}(Walk)DH2
− IND{LEMS}(Walk)D
=
|POS{LEMS}(Walk)DH1 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}| (17)
+
|POS{LEMS}(Walk)DH2 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
− 0|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
2
4 + 3
+
0
4 + 3
− 0
4 + 3
=
2
7
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By comparing and selecting feature with the highest dependency degree,
the process of feature selection proceeds to the next level by calculating the
dependency degree of the new set, which contains R = {Age, LEMS} for each
parties as shown in Equation 18.
γ{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH1 =
|POS{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH1 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|
=
|⋃X∈{x1,x2,x3,x4}/Walk Age, LEMSX|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|
=
|{x1, x2}|
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}| =
2
4
(18)
γ{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH2 =
|POS{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH2 |
|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
|⋃X∈{x5,x6,x7}/Walk Age, LEMSX|
|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
|{x5, x6, x7}|
|{x5, x6, x7}| =
3
3
The final dependency degree for R = {Age, LEMS} is calculated and illus-
trated in Equation 19.
γ{Age,LEMS}(Walk) = γ{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH1
+ γ{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH2
− IND{Age,LEMS}(Walk)D
=
|POS{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH1 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}| (19)
+
|POS{Age,LEMS}(Walk)DH2 |
|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
− 0|{x1, x2, x3, x4}|+|{x5, x6, x7}|
=
2
4 + 3
+
3
4 + 3
− 0
4 + 3
=
5
7
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Based on the greedy nature of QuickReduct algorithm, R = {Age, LEMS}
is selected, since it ends to the highest dependency degree.
5.2. Multi parties with horizontally partitioned data (MP-HP)
In multi-party environments, the most important challenge is to run secure
comparison as efficient as possible. Since many parties are involved, each should
calculate the dependency degree of each feature in their partitions and also find
indiscernible objects. Having a record of indiscernible objects help the whole
process by deciding on indiscernibility of objects from other partitions faster.
When the secure comparison process is triggered, objects from the other parti-
tion are compared with the objects in the indiscernible set of the same partition,
initially. If the decision on the indiscernibiliy is finalized, the corresponding de-
pendency degree should be affected. Otherwise, a thorough comparison should
be run on all non-indiscernible objects, also.
5.3. Two parties with vertically partitioned data (2P-VP)
In case of having vertically partitioned data, three principles should be fol-
lowed as follows:
1. Each partition should have the classification results
2. Features should have the same order in the whole dataset
3. A set of indiscernible objects should be created for each partition
As an illustrative example, the dataset in Table 3 has been partitioned ver-
tically into two datasets and shown in Tables 6 and 7.
By referring to the required principles for 2P-VP datasets, each partition has
classification outcome and also the order of samples are preserved. The only
remaining criterion is sets of indiscernible objects for both parties, which have
been calculated and mentioned in Equation 20.
IND{Age}(Walk)DV1 = {{x1, x2, x6}, {x3, x4}} (20)
IND{LEMS}(Walk)DV2 = {{x3, x4}, {x5, x6, x7}}
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Table 6: The first partition of vertically partitioned data DV1
Object Age Walk
x1 16-30 Yes
x2 16-30 No
x3 31-45 No
x4 31-45 Yes
x5 46-60 No
x6 16-30 Yes
x7 46-60 No
Table 7: The second partition of vertically partitioned data DV2
Object LEMS Walk
x1 50 Yes
x2 0 No
x3 1-25 No
x4 1-25 Yes
x5 26-49 No
x6 26-49 Yes
x7 26-49 No
As calculated in Equation 11, the dependency degree of each feature in each
partition is equal. So, one of feature should be selected to break the tie, since
both of them have the same dependency degree. Regardless of which feature
is selected, calculating the dependency degree of R = {Age, LEMS} requires
some efforts. Since all objects are available to each party and the exact value for
dependency degree can be calculated, each party should decide on the number
of indiscernible objects.
Party one (or two), needs to know if there is any intersection between the
two indiscernible sets, if any, the cardinality of the subset should be subtracted
from the number of objects in the dataset. The process is shown in Equation
24
21.
IND{Age}(Walk)DV1 = {{x1, x2, x6}, {x3, x4}}
IND{LEMS}(Walk)DV2 = {{x3, x4}, {x5, x6, x7}} (21)
IND{Age}(Walk)DV1 ∩ IND{LEMS}(Walk)DV2
= IND{Age,LEMS}(Walk)D
= {{x3, x4}}
Therefore, the final dependency degree is illustrated in Equation 22.
γ{Age,LEMS}(Walk) =
7
7
− 2
7
=
5
7
(22)
In cases which two partitions have more than one feature, each one should
calculate the dependency degree of all the features, as well as, their indicernibil-
ity sets. Then, a feature with the highest dependency degree should be added to
the reduct set. Therefore, there are two cases that should be addressed properly
for both partitions, as follows:
1. If the selected feature is in the same partition
2. If the selected feature is in the other partition
For the partition that contains the selected feature, the only task is to build
the reduct sets with two members and calculate the dependency degrees without
the need of communicating with other party. However, the other partition
should have indiscernibility set of the selected features to be able to find the
dependency degree of the sets with two members. Hence, a secure comparison
should be applied to fulfil this requirement.
5.4. Multi parties with vertically partitioned data (MP-VP)
In the environment with more than two parties and vertically partitioned
data, the same policy for 2P-VP works fine. The only issue is the amount
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of communication that is made to/from parties to compute the dependency
degrees. Therefore, a computationally inexpensive secure comparison is desired
to minimize the overall load.
6. Conclusion
Feature selection is the process of selecting important features while dis-
carding the others. This process is usually referred to as a pre-process since it
purifies data for a main process, such as classification. Almost all of the previ-
ously introduced feature selection methods are not useful for the current needs
which involve distributed and decentralized datasets and parties. Therefore,
researchers have tried to develop new feature selection methods which can be
applied to distributed datasets. In this paper, we have reviewed three feature
selection methods, and provided some suggestions to improve their performance
when identified. We have also introduced a privacy-preserving feature selection
method based on rough set feature selection. The proposed method, has been de-
signed to process both horizontally and vertically partitioned datasets for either
two-party or multi-party scenarios. As a future work, we are currently working
on privacy-preserving protocols for other standard feature selection methods, as
well as their formal security and complexity analyses, along with experimental
results on real data. Also, the performance and effectiveness of the proposed
method will be examined against UCI datasets. Finally, we will integrate all the
proposed protocols in an online privacy-preserving feature selection tool which
will be publicly available for non-commercial purposes.
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